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RECALLING THE FUTURE OF ACC 
Richard Gaskins∗ 
Richard Gaskins visited the Law Faculty as a Fulbright from January to August 1999 to study 
developments in the Accident Compensation regime.  His visit coincided with the controversy 
surrounding the National Government’s Accident Insurance Act 1998.  Professor Gaskins gave the 
following paper, in which he addresses the continued importance of the Woodhouse Report, at a 
seminar on Accident Compensation held as part of the 1999 Australasian Law Teachers' 
Association Conference. 
In the paper he highlights two important insights of the Woodhouse Report that he believes have 
lasting value: its linking of tort reform to social welfare and its promotion of an ecological approach 
to preventing accidents.  Professor Gaskins concludes that both insights retain their importance and 
challenges legal academics to address them as well as the more narrowly based law and economic 
approach to accidents that has dominated legal policy and academic thought since the early 1970s. 
This year marks the twenty-fifth anniversary of the accident compensation scheme 
(ACC) in New Zealand, but celebrations are somewhat muted.  Within New Zealand, a 
debate is now taking shape over two very different futures for ACC, as projected by the 
leading political parties.  The National Party passed a comprehensive new law in 
December 1998, the Accident Insurance Act (AIA), which carries ACC part way down the 
road to privatisation.  The Labour Party, meanwhile, has vowed to repeal that law, should 
it win the next election, and to return to earlier principles, including a single public fund 
and new strategies for prevention and rehabilitation. 
This paper speaks to some wider policy debates, both here and abroad, that touch on 
the New Zealand experience.  The world took strong notice of ACC when the scheme 
began, and one of the first challenges for academics today is to reassess the historical 
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significance of that original vision, including its impact on other countries.  A second task 
for academic inquiry is to interpret the ups and downs of ACC's eventful life, through all 
the vagaries of implementation.  We already have Ian Campbell's fine study, but more 
such work will be needed.  A third task should look to the future, to speculate on new 
directions in compensation policy in light of the New Zealand experience.  My comments 
are restricted to the first and third tasks, and thus deal with both the historical and future 
significance of ACC. 
I shall focus on the Royal Commission on Personal Injury, which reported in December 
1967 under the chairmanship of Sir Owen Woodhouse.1  The Woodhouse Report and its 
much-reproduced five principles have become something of a mantra in later discussions, 
at risk of becoming a rhetorical rag-bag for quite opposing views.  There are essentially 
three ways to regard the Woodhouse Report at this point in history.  First, the Report had 
little to offer back in 1967, and we should start over with policies based on current needs.  
Second, the Report actually did have something useful to say back then; but those were 
warm and fuzzy days, and it is time to pass on to something more contemporary.  And 
third, the Report actually said something profound and prophetic, creative in its own day, 
but also useful in future policy development. 
This paper explains briefly why I think the third position is correct.  It concludes that 
the Woodhouse scheme belongs at the forefront of future policy debates, and that it 
contains certain valuable insights that have not been fully appreciated, both in New 
Zealand and abroad.  I shall combine my observations on past and future by focusing on 
two central ideas in the Woodhouse conceptual universe.  Although I begin by placing 
these ideas in their historical context, I believe that their future importance cannot simply 
be presumed, but rather needs to be restated in contemporary terms. 
The first of these central ideas speaks to the relationship between civil liability law, as 
Woodhouse found it in 1967, and the social welfare philosophies of his day.  This 
relationship between law and social welfare is vital, but has gotten lost in the past 25 years 
as ACC has settled into its unique bureaucratic niche.  The Woodhouse Report integrates 
personal-injury law with social welfare principles, paying attention to both sides of the 
equation.  On the one side, Woodhouse measured outcomes of the common law regime by 
using substantive standards of social welfare, not the conventional formal standards 
internal to the judicial process.  On the other side, and more dramatically, he borrowed 
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common-law notions to create new definitions of social welfare.  This complex, two-way 
argument needs to be understood from both sides of the relationship.2 
The first part of the argument is not original with Woodhouse.  It says that personal-
injury law is not an end in itself, but should serve larger goals of public benefit.  Even 
when the legal process shows perfect formal consistency and propriety, it must be 
measured by extrinsic goals of public policy.  From this perspective, personal-injury law 
fails to deliver "comprehensive entitlement," one of the five Woodhouse principles.  Using 
various welfare standards, this functional perspective goes back through the history of tort 
law commentary, all the way back to Holmes on the American side.  By the 1960s the 
standards of modern welfare states were invoked to challenge the operation of tort law as 
a compensation system, notably by the Oxford scholar (and New Zealander) Donald 
Harris3 and by Canadian professor Terence Ison.4  Ison's book-length indictment of the 
"forensic lottery" works out the fine details of this critique.  Even Guido Calabresi echoed 
the received wisdom in his landmark book.5  To be sure, definitions of "welfare" remained 
diverse during this period, but welfare-instrumentalism of some variety was standard fare.  
Perhaps the only American tort commentator to dissent was the young Richard Epstein, 
who built his first doctrinal arguments on a libertarian blend of moral intuition and 
natural law.6 
The Woodhouse Report was more original in its reverse argument, which expanded 
the meaning of public welfare by importing common law notions of responsibility.  It is 
worth recalling that the Woodhouse Report appeared when another Royal Commission 
was being formed to review benefits under social security and health programmes.  The 
basic criteria of public welfare in New Zealand were not only different from those used by 
most American tort scholars, but were themselves in a state of flux.  The Woodhouse 
Report made one of its most daring contributions in arguing for earnings-related benefits 
in a public welfare scheme, invoking common-law standards of entitlement under the 
Woodhouse rubric of "real compensation."  These deliberations on welfare seem long 
distant now, given the revolution in social policy that swept through Thatcher's Britain, 
Reagan's America, and Douglas' New Zealand in the 1980s.  Alongside its other purposes, 
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the Woodhouse Report was advancing a new standard of public entitlement.  In the 
context of personal injury compensation, welfare and distributive justice were said to be 
mutually reinforcing.  Perhaps the same principle could extend to other parts of social 
welfare? 
The social policy side of the equation was not fully developed in the Woodhouse 
Report, but the 1972 Report of the Royal Commission on Social Security7 lays it out for 
discussion.  That Report ponders three competing welfare criteria aimed at different levels 
of support for recipients: offering them basic subsistence, preserving their capacity for 
social participation; and maintaining their achieved economic status.  Using the field of 
personal-injury compensation as its paradigm case, the Woodhouse scheme was one of the 
first proposals anywhere in the world for the third type of public entitlement.  Woodhouse 
borrowed from common-law justice to import this ideal into the field of accident 
compensation, but from there it was open to further expansion on principles of general 
equity.  Had it occurred, such expansion would have fulfilled the dynamic model 
projected by the English welfare theorist, Richard Titmuss,8 itself based on the 
evolutionary arguments of T H Marshall on social citizenship.  Although history did not 
work out this way, Titmuss had predicted that the welfare states of Western Europe would 
reach a point of economic development where they could secure the economic 
independence of all citizens.  Earnings-related benefits were the goal.  The New Zealand 
ACC gained international attention for building this new approach into legislation.  A 
clever judge had transplanted a social welfare principle into common-law soil. 
The tension between compensation for accidents and compensation for illness needs to 
be seen in this light.  The Woodhouse Report announced the broader logic of its new 
standard: welfare justice for accident compensation should be extended to incapacity from 
any source, including disease.9  The Report left it to pending reviews of health and social 
security to expand these entitlement principles, once Woodhouse had firmly anchored 
them in common-law notions of real compensation.  And, indeed, the Royal Commission 
on Social Security tentatively endorsed the Woodhouse standard for sickness benefits - but 
not for other welfare entitlements, opting instead for the middle standard of social 
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participation.10  In the evolutionary context of the time, nonetheless, the 1972 Report was 
still travelling in the same direction, down the trail blazed by Woodhouse. 
The Woodhouse Report was an ingenious concoction of traditional jurisprudence and 
evolving welfare principles.  But now, three decades later, that vision seems eclipsed by 
events.  The Woodhouse-ACC era belongs on the other side of that great economic and 
ideological divide, marked by two big oil-shocks of the 1970s and the rise of monetarism 
and other anti-statist movements.  Today, for many policy analysts and academics, 
everything on the far side of that divide is ancient history; we have put the welfare state 
behind us.  Does this mean the Woodhouse principles are hopelessly archaic?   
This is not my own conclusion.  We turn to history to understand the present, and not 
simply to feel superior to experiments of the past.  Current prescriptions for ACC are 
themselves based on social welfare criteria that are annoyingly vague and imprecise, often 
tacitly drawn from the standards of microeconomic efficiency.  It is far easier to dismiss the 
past than to defend these newer visions of public good.  Ideas about social welfare today 
are just as fluid and contested as they were in the days of Woodhouse, but long-term 
assumptions have changed dramatically.  In New Zealand this shift is now deeply 
embedded: privatising state institutions and trusting markets to produce better results are 
regarded by many as the inevitable course of progress.  In this new evolutionary 
framework, shrinking the public sector occupies somewhat the same status today that 
Titmuss' confident welfare expansion occupied in the 1960s.  Whether you embrace this 
change or abhor it, the fact remains that concepts of public welfare still shape ACC 
legislation, up to the present day.  They may hide behind the analytic models of 
microeconomists, but their power can be detected in the descending benefit structures that 
accompanied ACC reforms in the 1990s.  No doubt different welfare definitions are 
present in the Labour Party's alternative model, which rejects the trend toward lower 
safety-nets.  To be sure, earnings-related benefits from the Woodhouse era have lost their 
original significance, especially given the greater disparities of incomes today in New 
Zealand, as opposed to 1967.   But standards of public entitlement must still be defined, 
and basic subsistence is only one option among several.  
The Woodhouse Report was singular in the degree to which it explained its distinctive 
welfare vision.  To say this is not necessarily to endorse a return to the welfare state of the 
1960s, but rather to push today's debates on accident compensation to a deeper level: to 
reach their foundations in contestable definitions of public good.  Moving to this level is 
especially urgent for the accident compensation debate in New Zealand, but it is also 
important for ongoing debates about tort reform, workers' compensation and civil liability 
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systems throughout the developed world.  Academic commentators can supply this 
missing dimension, inspired perhaps by the boldness of Woodhouse's example. 
However, there is still more to be said about the Woodhouse Report, besides 
commending its clear reflection on social norms.  I mentioned earlier that I would explore 
two major issues, one of which was this reciprocal connection between social welfare and 
common law.  While this complex idea is important and often overlooked in published 
summaries of the Woodhouse era, it concentrates more on values beyond the physical 
reality of accidents.  Missing from this formula is a powerful companion theme that runs 
throughout the Woodhouse Report, traveling under the mysterious phrase "community 
responsibility."  This term is frequently dismissed as idle rhetoric and it risks becoming 
almost meaningless by casual repetition in New Zealand debates.  To me, it has always 
offered the key to unlocking the Woodhouse legacy.  Above all, it warns against one of the 
tragic failures of the New Zealand ACC in practice: the failure to address accident 
prevention in a comprehensive fashion. 
Time permits only a brief explanation of this last but most central part of the 
Woodhouse message, which defines "accidents" in a new way.  Let me paraphrase it as 
follows.  Accidents are complex human events, involving multiple lines of responsibility.  
All events — including accidental events — are overdetermined by multiple causes, 
guided by multiple agents.  This message is not some descent into chaos theory, but a dose 
of sociological realism supported by a long tradition of progressive social analysis.11  
Strictly personal choices are not the ultimate building blocks of the universe, but are 
always socially embedded.  Collective action is more than the sum of its parts.  It follows 
that responsibility for accidents is not completely reduced to private individuals and their 
discrete choices, but assumes parallel lines of responsibility for groups, networks, 
organisations, corporations and government agencies.  These agents, in turn, act upon each 
other through a matrix of structures, forces and systems; some of which they only dimly 
understand.  Human beings can control their environment, but not entirely.  Their success 
depends on social co-ordination, not just assertions of personal choices. 
People have begun to recognise that the accidents regularly befalling large numbers of 
their fellow citizens are due not so much to human error as to the complicated and uneasy 
environment which everybody tolerates for its apparent advantages.  The risks are the 
risks of social progress, and if there are instinctive feelings at work today in this general 
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area they are not concerned with the greater or lesser faults of individuals, but with the 
wider responsibility of the whole community.12 
Just because Woodhouse says it does not mean it is true, of course.  In 1967 there was 
possibly little recognition of where this rather dense concept might lead.  Community 
responsibility was a malleable phrase within the Woodhouse Report.  For some readers, it 
meant simply that the accident scheme should be funded by a wide range of contributors.  
At times it seemed to play with metaphysical abstractions, projecting some brooding 
societal agent as vicariously responsible for all the accidents that happen, no matter how 
private or personal they may seem.  Thirty years later, however, I think we can explain this 
concept better as an ecological perspective on accidents.  Human ecology was a young 
discipline at mid-century and by the 1960s it was applied to environmental degradation in 
books like Rachel Carson's Silent Spring.13  Epidemiological science and its universe of risk 
factors matured during the 1960s as a corollary of these trends.  I am not saying that the 
environmental movement influenced Woodhouse directly, the way Terry Ison's book 
obviously did.  I think rather that Woodhouse discovered for himself the equivalent 
ecological relations at work in modern industrial accidents, much as Durkheim found 
them by studying social relations at the turn of the last century.  Finally, please note that 
this perspective applies equally to chronic disease and traumatic injury.  Indeed, it absorbs 
personal injuries into a public health framework.14 
This is not the occasion to push this interpretation much further.  Instead let me apply 
it to one highly contentious issue in the current New Zealand debate: the problem of 
accident prevention.  If the Woodhouse philosophy of social welfare strikes you as dated, 
his ecological theory of accidents may seem rather far ahead of its time.  By comparison 
with the welfare-economic theory of accident deterrence, which still dominates the 
writings of most legal academics and policy analysts, the Woodhouse principle is closer in 
spirit to different injury prevention methods that are now in the ascendancy.  And finally, 
at the end of the day, the ecological theory of accidents provides entirely new reasons to 
revisit the Woodhouse welfare philosophy, which should not be counted as entirely dead. 
Briefly, then, let me return through history and take you back to the 1970s, after the 
Woodhouse Report had been transformed into the early ACC.  Despite their concurrence 
on the limits of common law as a compensation system, up-and-coming tort theorists 
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around 1970 were poised to diverge from the Woodhouse approach.  They found a new 
social function for common law in the field of accident prevention.  It soon became 
fashionable among international (as well as New Zealand) commentators to dismiss the 
Woodhouse project as naïve and unlettered for failing to acknowledge this trend toward 
deterrence-based prevention.  The New Zealand Business Roundtable (NZBRT) considers 
this omission in Woodhouse a massive "non sequitur," although the NZBRT's own vision 
prefers private contracts to tort in pursuit of deterrence.15  I must admit, for my part, that I 
share the quite different view expressed in 1980 by the Israeli legal scholar Izhak Englard, 
who described this whole shift to deterrence theory in torts scholarship as "…a desperate 
scholarly rearguard action to preserve a traditional system of individualism in a changing 
world….".16  
My time permits me only to assert, without any real defence, that the Calabresi-Posner 
turn to accident deterrence was a costly diversion from the richer possibilities contained in 
the Woodhouse Report.  Calabresi made a brilliant contribution to analytic theory by 
applying new formal concepts in welfare economics to a small, time-bound question 
within tort law: the choice between doctrines of strict liability and negligence in the new 
field of product liability.  Posner answered him in 1972 on this limited topic, importing still 
further neo-classical assumptions about human behaviour from his Chicago School 
colleagues.  The full-blown theory of accident deterrence then emerged the way many 
academic fashions develop, as a scholastic exercise in formal modeling, exploiting all the 
intellectual rigor of economic theory-building.  In historical terms, this academic trend 
soon dovetailed with a major ideological shift in public policy in the 1980s, away from 
state-building policies and toward market systems as the new guardians of public welfare.  
What neo-liberal policy analysts liked about the Calabresi-Posner movement was the 
theory of deterrence through market-style signals.  Indeed, tort law became a baroque 
afterthought, and in America most deterrence theorists want to trim tort doctrines severely 
to match their deeper image of ideal markets.  Tort law as an independent force, let alone 
its sense of justice, drops out of the equation, to the extent it is not instrumental toward 
achieving market goals.  
New Zealand, of course, is the one place on earth where personal injury law has 
already dropped out entirely, although for reasons quite different from those advocated by 
the NZBRT and others.  When Woodhouse recommended an end to personal injury 
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lawsuits, he did not envision a world without deterrence.  His scheme left clear space for a 
comprehensive accident prevention strategy that is still waiting to be discovered and 
implemented.  Rather than calling it "deterrence", which preserves a musty Benthamite 
vocabulary, I believe we should follow Woodhouse and imagine a broader public policy of 
injury "prevention." 
Prevention is broader than deterrence because it includes a range of strategies beyond 
manipulation of personal motives through monetary rewards.  It also requires careful 
attention to environmental design, public education, group interaction, organisational 
cultures and political coordination.  Any modern policy of accident prevention that does 
not consider these strategies will miss the important health and safety challenges of the 
coming century.  During the years that legal scholars have perfected their models of 
optimal deterrence, a very different literature has developed using ecological models of 
injury prevention, resting on established public health principles.17  That literature speaks 
to the challenge laid down by the Woodhouse Report when it made accident prevention its 
top priority, calling for a comprehensive and coordinated response to health and safety 
risks.  This coordinated response is certainly one of the key meanings of "community 
responsibility". 
The current ACC policy debate in New Zealand highlights these two competing 
approaches to accident prevention.  On the one hand, the National Party's 1998 Accident 
Insurance Act advances the market-deterrence strategy, relying on insurance premiums set 
by private contracts.  On the other hand, the Labour Party's proposed model borrows more 
from the ecological perspective, which subordinates market incentives to risk-reduction 
practices.   Assuming that competition is always a good thing, it is time these two visions 
were encouraged to compete head-on in the academic literature, as well as in the policy 
arena. 
In conclusion, let me suggest a broader coherence between the Woodhouse approach to 
injury prevention and his distinctive views on public welfare.  Remember, Woodhouse, 
made distributive justice into a structural element of social welfare.  Both in 1967 and 
today, personal injuries indicate losses that have already occurred; a random but 
statistically necessary part of our society has lost something through personal injury, and 
social justice requires some coordinated response.  You cannot disguise the distributive 
nature of this analysis, nor its striking legal sense of obligation.  Public welfare must 
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address distribution as a matter of justice, redeeming the old common-law ideals of real 
compensation and comprehensive entitlement.   In today's public welfare philosophies, the 
commitment to distributive justice is largely missing; it finds no easy place within the 
scope of efficiency-driven economics.  For many, the cost of ACC is simply a net burden to 
the public purse, and funding ACC is like any other budget decision - purchasing a new 
frigate, or indeed cutting taxes.  According to the Woodhouse model, however, the costs of 
injury belong in some different calculation.  These costs have already been paid by some 
members of society, and the question is whether to leave them randomly assigned or to 
distribute them according to a principle of equity. 
Let me conclude with that puzzle.  If you wrestle with it, I think you will realise what 
Woodhouse was trying to say about social welfare back in 1967.  Today we might select a 
different standard of benefits than what Woodhouse suggested, but it is hard to reject his 
basic argument that justice demands a co-ordinated social response to personal injury.  
Alongside his theory of prevention, these important welfare notions belong in the policy 
debates of future decades. 
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